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I. In this paper, I will discuss a couple of ways that our experiences as individuals are
affected by the capitalist structures of the society we live in. Mainly, I will focus on the process
of reification, and whether it can help us understand society. There is reason to believe that by
living in the late-capitalist society that is the United States, we are expediting our process of
dying. Tempting, as it may be, to call upon statistics, they would be meaningless in the context
of this paper. Therefore, I will not reference studies which may posit conclusions such as suicide
being one of the leading causes of death in America or that one of the leading causes of
homelessness is exorbitant medical bills. It seems that understanding the world, purely in this
quantitative fashion, still misses the actual nature and experience that people live. That is
ultimately what philosophers like Lukács and Heidegger aim to capture; experience.
In the midst of a global pandemic, impending environmental collapse, economic
recession, and a game show host as our president, most Americans feel as though there is little
hope for the future. The United States has often championed itself as one of the richest and most
“developed” nations in the contemporary world. However, despite this assertion of superiority
our society believes, to some degree, that some of its members do not deserve access to
healthcare, food, and shelter. As I am writing this project during COVID-19, we are seeing
unprecedented unemployment levels. At the same time, we also are seeing great gains in the
stock market, which means wealth is being consolidated even more against the working class to
benefit those on top. We have empty hotels, with the rooms being illuminated to display heart
symbols to the homeless people sleeping in cold parking lots below, where they have drawn out
spaces for them to distance themselves. Food service industry workers went from being ignored
by politicians when asking for better pay and working conditions to “essential employees.” Yet,
unfortunately, in most cases the term “essential employee” still translates to long hours and
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unlivable wages with no hazard pay. Truthfully, “essential” really means “expendable” for these
workers in the eyes of our society.
In the year 2020, we have mass graves in New York City, and our society is debating the
semantics of what a “mass grave” is; the same society that debates the semantics of whether we
can call the camps on the border “concentration camps.” While the media debates what type of
words we should use to describe the absolute inhumanity of what is happening, we lose any
sense of meaning that was already there. The focus is on semantics and not on the experiences.
The focus is on the things and not the people. We have people in prison, from non-violent
offenders to the wrongfully convicted, who are now at a huge risk of getting infected with the
virus. This is happening in a place where access to quality medical treatment is even harder to
get than it is for the common American (which is already hard for a different reason) and we will
not release them. Our hospitals are now at the point where people are dying alone, with a disease
that isolates them from their family; adding to this gloomy visage, doctors have to practice triage
just to determine who is worth saving because supplies are limited. All of these problems in
society, that I just highlighted, reflect a persistent reality for many poor and working people.
However, COVID-19 has shown that these problems were an inevitable experience for the ever-
shrinking middle class. Amongst the youth, nihilism is running rampant. We feel as though there
is nothing that matters in the future; this world that we have been thrust into without our consent
has nothing to offer us. A common sentiment, uttered by my contemporaries, is, “If the virus
isn’t going to kill me, global warming probably will.” A lot of these experiences that are
happening right now in society, can be attributed to a positivized existence, because we are so
caught up in trying to maintain this idealized notion of the “American dream.” While COVID-19
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and the problems I highlighted are not central to this project, the effect of what is happening to
the individual is.
Georg Lukács published History and Class Consciousness in 1923, well before we were
in the age of globalized economics like we see today. During this time, the Bolshevik Revolution
was wrapping up and the world was in the process of recovering from World War I. One part of
what I will be investigating, in this project, is whether or not this concept and process can be
applicable in 2020. I will ask whether “reification” still has some relevance in the modern
context; it is describing a system that is different from modern late capitalism as Lukács was
writing in the time of industrial capitalism. A feature of modern American capitalism is that
unlike before, where corporations and the government were more separated, the State and the
corporations seem to serve similar interests and protect the same class. Ultimately, I plan to show
that while reification has relevance because it does describe how a worker becomes alienated, I
think that we have probably moved on from calling the process simply “reification,” because
Lukács was not talking about late-stage capitalism. Therefore, I am arguing that reification is too
loaded a concept for 2020 to be directly translated, but it still has use as a tool for understanding
the reduction of the working class consciousness.
In our analysis of reification, I will be defining what reification is and how Lukácsian
scholars explain that it pervades from society down to the individual experience in our society.
As a result I will be showing that reification has existential qualities because it is an experience;
this is not to say I will posit a brand new understanding of reification. I will also be investigating
whether some concepts from other authors can aid in our understanding of reification. In doing
so, I will be making a subtle critique of capitalist structures and society. A hard part in
understanding the process of reification is not falling victim to the very process that reification is
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describing. This difficulty will inform our analysis about the contemporary status of reification
and whether or not it even makes contemporary sense to use “reification.”
In order to give an evaluation of the contemporary status of reification, we will have to
look at the relationship between reification and commodity fetishism and understand these
concepts through the help of secondary sources. We will lay out some fundamental Marxist
economic concepts, that show how labor and time have become reified through commodification.
After that, we will dive into the effects that the workers feel in a society where exploitative
economic practices are the norm; this is something that we still see today. What this discussion
will highlight is the concept of “alienation.” Alienation is important because, as we have already
seen, it is a phenomenon that is felt not only individually, but societally. Ultimately, Lukács is
responding against the positivism that pervades Orthodox Marxism and philosophy in general.
Following the discussion of Lukács’ expansion of Marxist economic concepts, we will
look at the possible conceptual relationship between Lukács and Heidegger. The feeling of
“alienation” also appears to be at the center of Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety. What I plan to
show is that both philosophers provide great examples of why positivism is a negative way of
thought, especially when talking about the experience of the individual. Lukács and Heidegger
did not agree on everything; we will examine Lukács’ criticism of Heidegger. Despite this, the
idea that the psychologization of anxiety is an example of positivist thought will be explored. We
will also see if reification can be applied to our discussion of anxiety. Ultimately, both
philosophers are concerned with the historical subject; they just have different definitions of what
that is.
The next section will focus on how Herbert Marcuse was able to engage with both
Lukács and Heidegger. This is mainly to show an example of an author who was able to combine
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concepts that were historically separate: Existential Phenomenology and Marxism. This means
he is looking at the individual in capitalism specifically. In his later works, Marcuse embraced
psychoanalytic philosophy to further show the effect of society on our psychology and behavior.
In a series of lectures on Freud, he shows an example of what Grondin talks about in his analysis
of reified labor-time. Marcuse talks about the repression that takes place in a worker who is
alienated from their labor, which is something that is hinted at in our analysis of Lukács.
I will have looked at some of the possible conceptual relationships between Lukács,
Heidegger, and Marcuse, with reification at the center of our dialogue. I also will have
illustrated that the working class that Lukács and Marcuse are referencing, experience reification
and that is a part of what alienates them from not only their labor but also their social sphere. The
alienation that takes place could possibly be described by what Heidegger talks about with the
lived experience of anxiety. After my analysis of these authors, in my conclusion, I will shift the
focus back to the point brought up earlier, namely on whether or not reification has
contemporary relevance.
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II. Reification is most closely associated with Marxist philosophy as a result of Georg
Lukács’ contributions in History and Class Consciousness. On a larger scale, Jean Grondin notes
that “reification” actually has relevance in both the Analytic and Continental traditions, but we
will focus on the Continental way of using it.1 There is a lot to be said about the epistemological
status of reification. As Timothy Bewes points out, there is a certain ironic reifying quality to
people’s discussions of reification.2 We will come back to the discussion of this irony later; his
point is related to the contemporary relevance of reification. I do not think there is any denying
that what Lukács is describing in the process of reification can still be observed in our society
because the working class is still alienated from time and labor. However, I think that we should
be wary of actually calling it “reification.” One aspect of reification, that we will need to take
into consideration, is that we are talking about a concept from almost a hundred years ago before
the internet and globalized economies.
A problem in most people’s understanding of reification is that they routinely confuse
“reification” with concepts like “commodity fetishism,” and “alienation.” The confusion is not
unforgivable because the concepts are extremely interrelated and similar. Therefore, in order to
understand reification, we must also have an understanding of all the concepts that are related.
However, the main problem is trying to distinguish reification from commodity fetishism.
Reification is not simply a conceptual “thing.” Instead, it is an experiential process that
is rooted in consciousness. Most of our discussion and analysis of reification will be from
contemporary Lukácsian scholars in Lukács Today. “Reification” stems from the latin words res
and facere, meaning thing and to make, respectively. A literal understanding of reification is the
process wherein a concept becomes a thing; a non-object becomes an object. Timothy Bewes
1 Jean Grondin, “Reification from Lukács to Habermas,” trans. David Lang, in Lukács Today, ed. Tom Rockmore
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1988), 87
2 Timothy Bewes, Reification: The Anxiety of Late Capitalism, (New York: Verso, 2002), 5
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says that “[r]eification refers to the moment that a process or relation is generalized into an
abstraction, and thereby turned into a ‘thing.’”3 Perhaps a clearer explanation of this is Jean
Grondin’s who says “[r]eification designates the transformation into a ‘thing’ of what, originally,
does not have the mode of being of a thing.”4
Before going into how one should understand reification, I will provide some brief
context that is important in understanding why Lukács proposes the concept of reification as a
move from the traditional Marxist concept “commodity fetishism.” Lukács’ History and Class
Consciousness was published in 1923, and it was crucial in providing a philosophical and
historical understanding of Marxism and the Revolution of 1917. Lukács believed that this was a
time where Orthodox Marxism had drifted from classical philosophy and vice-versa. In
philosophy, Marxism was called “positivism” or “materialism,” and it was treated like a science
or economic theory. On the other hand, Marxist reflections relating to problems within
consciousness were no longer relevant because theorists could scientifically explain the socio-
economic systems at hand. This results with “consciousness being a simple mirror image [...] of
economic reality.”5 Lukács believed Marxism was focused too strictly on the historical and
economic aspects of society, and therefore neglected to account for the actual experiential
relation of the proletariat worker in bourgeois capitalist society. Reification in History and Class
Consciousness is a central theme for the discussion of the reduction of the proletariat
consciousness. Lukács believed that this scientific and economic reductionism from Marxist
theorists was in fact a result of the process of reification from bourgeois ideology.6 This is
because Marxism had become positivized to some degree. From this we can conclude that
3 Bewes, Reification, 3
4 Grondin, “Reification from Lukács to Habermas,” 88.
5 Ibid., 87.
6 Ibid., 88.
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Lukács thinks that the process of reification is different from a purely economic process.
Therefore we can begin to see how these authors discuss reification as separate yet similar to
commodity fetishism. To describe this relationship simply: reification is more than commodity
fetishism. What I mean by this, is that the process of reification seems to be an expansion of
commodity fetishism. It seems that Lukács attributes commodity fetishism to a more economic,
and as result, objectivist framework. I believe the reason he uses “reification” instead of
“commodity fetishism” to describe what is taking place in commodity fetishism, is because he
wants to move the understanding of reification from commodities (objects in the world) to
experiences (consciousness), specifically the experiences of the working class. This would make
reification a sociological process. Lukács is not positioning himself as a proto-sociologist,
because he is informed by sociologists like Max Weber and Georg Simmel.
Grondin and others provide some analysis of Marx’s theory of commodities found in
Capital and how Lukács is addressing them within History and Class Consciousness. Marx first
distinguishes use-value from exchange-value in relation to commodities. This is important for
Lukács, because by distinguishing use-value and exchange-value, he is able to illustrate from
Marx that there is a social origin involved in the exchange of commodities. Grondin continues
and says this is because we see that it is human labor that determines the price of a commodity.
Further, if we separate the use-value of a commodity from the exchange-value of a commodity,
we see what is similar in the nature of commodities; that they are products of labor. Grondin
illustrates how, because of profit from capital, the worker produces more profit for the capitalist
than what is paid to the worker. The worker is then paid a wage that allows them to buy other
commodities, but that wage also still forces them to work for the capitalist.
According to Marx, the profit which the owner of the means of production
collects arises from the disproportion between the compensation given to the
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work-force and the value that it effectively produces in goods. It is, therefore, on
the exploitation of human work that the production of goods and the inequality of
social classes rest.7
Grondin’s quote on Marx reflects the notion that a capitalist society is built upon economic
exploitation and that said exploitation translates into a cultural phenomenon. Another point is
that profit takes on an object-like nature because it seems like it physically follows the
production of goods. This leads Marx to think that the structures of commodities are thing-like in
nature, because bourgeois ideology tends to think of commodities as some type of magical
surplus generators. “Commodities in the process of exchange take on an existence independent
of their function in the process of man’s self-realization: instead they come to stand opposed to
the original goals of the economic process itself and attain an abstract being of their own.”8
Grondin is talking about the idea that in a capitalist society, the exchange-value of commodities
are a hindrance to society, because labor is made to be thinglike and thus not important.
Therefore, the worker’s labor is a commodity itself, and the exchange value, which is rooted in a
social relation, is reduced to a reified state. This does not suggest that social qualities are erased,
but rather falsely attributed. Instead of the actual social part of commodities: labor and exchange-
value; the commodities themselves take on a social quality.9
So how is commodity fetishism different from reification? The difference lies mainly in
the connotation and context, and it is most likely that commodity fetishism is a type of reification.
Remember, Lukács is replying against seemingly objectivist thoughts that were inherent to
Orthodox Marxism, because positivism pervaded society, and he thinks by moving to reification,
he is losing the positivist connotations. So despite the explicit references to the social aspect in
7 Ibid., 89
8 Luis Dupre, “Objectivism and the Rise of Cultural Alienation,” in Lukács Today, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1988), 72
9 William L McBride, “Reification Re-Examined,” in Lukács Today, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Co., 1988), 116
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the theory of commodities, Lukács is claiming that commodity fetishism is a process that is
primary to the economic sphere (an economic process), while reification is a sociological process.
Grondin notes that for Lukács, he is not discounting the economic relation that is inherent to
societal structures, but rather making a more explicit expansion from economic spheres to social
spheres. We also have seen that Marx is not discounting the social element that is inherent to
economies in commodity fetishism.10 Dupre expands on this notion because he says that for
Lukács, a critique of the economy can be made in a similar vein about society whereas Marx is
less clear. Lukács is establishing from Marx that the commodification of labor is not simply an
economic problem, but rather a structural problem of society. With this being the case, Lukács
wants to shift the focus of Marx’s critique from economic structures to more universal structures.
“Commodity has become a universal determinant not only of the economic process, but of all
social relations.”11 The workers no longer see each other as other humans, because the nature of
exchange-value makes them see each other as commodities, and therefore objects. So really what
I am saying here is that reification is an expansion of commodity fetishism, because it is being
written in a time later than when Marx was writing and responding to the problems of his time.
What this expansion is also establishing is that the exploitation of the worker is a
structural component to a capitalist society, and by saying this we are also saying that the process
of reification is a structural component of living in a capitalist society. While Lukács is
describing a process that occurs in the world, he wants to also investigate how the individual is
affected. Because we are essentially talking about one of the ways that our individual being is
affected by capitalism, this may lead one to falsely think of “reification” as a psychological
process. Instead, it is a process that affects our psychology. Reification ultimately is close to
10 Grondin, “Reification from Lukács to Habermas,” 89-90.
11 Dupre, “Objectivism and the Rise of Cultural Alienation.” 74
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being parallel to Marx’s commodity fetishism. From an epistemological standpoint, both terms
are describing a very similar process. The way they are distinct is because “reification” was used
chronologically after “commodity fetishism.” Thus “reification” is an expansion from
“commodity fetishism.” One can make the interpretation that commodity fetishism has cultural
and social implications, which is probably true. Nonetheless, Lukács thinks reification is more
accurate in capturing the cultural aspect to commodity fetishism. To sum up this part of my
section, Lukács is more clearly outlining that this process of commodity fetishism has explicitly
greater implications than what can be interpreted from Marx. This is mainly because the
interpretation of Marxism during Lukács’ time was a victim to positivist thought. Positivist
thoughts are themselves representations of the reified consciousness that is prevalent in
bourgeois culture that Lukács is talking about. Because just how labor is reified, the
consciousness itself is reified. What I mean here is that the labor itself loses its experiential
qualities and becomes a thing. The reason labor is so important for understanding reification is
because labor is the only phenomenon commodity that absolutely has no thing-like nature to it in
its actual state, yet it takes on a phantom objectivity because it is required to uphold a capitalist
society. “Phantom objectivity” means that labor appears as an object or thing despite it not being
that. Labor shouldn’t have a thing-like nature to it, since it is an experience it should be
something that one wants to do. The labor itself should be what externally motivates one to get
out of bed, not the prospect of starving. However in capitalism, we have completely lost all
understanding of how to authentically experience labor. Effectively then, labor loses its meaning
because it is experienced alienated and different from the original nature of labor. 12
Before I can talk about how reification affects individuals, I should make it known that
reification is not a process that exclusively affects the proletariat, but it also affects the bourgeois,
12 McBride, “Reification Re-examined,” 116
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this means that the process is experienced differently by both classes. Since the process of
reification is a structural component of bourgeois society, it logically has to affect both classes.
Lukács thinks of the relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeois in reification similar
to Hegel’s master and slave. The bourgeois are unable to see that they also are reified because
they support and benefit that process that upholds the status quo. I am saying that the
exploitation of the workers by their reified experience of labor into commodities is what benefits
the bourgeois and maintains their status quo. So what this means is that while both classes are
affected, only the proletariat suffers, but also they are the only class that can escape reification
and challenge the powers that be.
Because it is to the detriment of the proletariat that reification occurs – because it
is the proletariat which in its suffering bears the burden of capitalist exploitation –
its social situation must, for that reason, take the form of an objectivity separated
from the subjectivity of the worker, a brutal objectification of work which will
thus be able to be raised to consciousness.13
The proletariat are, therefore, both the subject and the object. The proletariat is able to recognize
their exploitation from a reified consciousness; the bourgeois only benefit from the process at
hand, so they have no way of escaping or challenging it. We have seen that labor has a
humanistic element to it, because it is a social experience. However, the bourgeois stamp out that
element of labor by reducing the proletariat consciousness through reification. Despite this, the
proletariat are able to maintain their humanity because they have not fallen completely victim to
an objectivized mindset because they don’t benefit from that mindset.14 They are the subject,
because they are able to be cognizant of their conditions; they are the object because they are
alienated and oppressed by these conditions. This is how we start to see that reification is not
only a structural aspect to the upholding of a capitalist society, but also that reification is
13 Grondin, “Reification from Lukács to Habermas,” 93
14 Bewes, Reification, 93-94
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suppression of the worker’s subjectivity that helps maintain a capitalist society. Ultimately,
reification is as much an economic problem as a sociological problem and also a
phenomenological problem because we are dealing with lived experiences of individuals. It is for
that reason that Lukács decides to move beyond commodity fetishism. The reason History and
Class Consciousness has “class” in the title is because the subject is a collective individual.
While this also refers to an actual singular individual, it also refers to the collective individual,
i.e. the proletariat. Which is why Lukács says that the proletariat and bourgeois relationship is
dialectically rooted.
From our foundation, we can discuss how reification affects the consciousness of the
proletariat and that is mainly through an understanding of alienation. I interpret alienation to be
the result of reification, mainly in a phenomenological sense, because what is at the core of
alienation is the experience of the worker, and thus their existence in society. Grondin provides a
quote that links the two main reified aspects of the worker’s experience: labor and exchange
value. “Reification is, [...] the fact of a double alienation: the worker is first of all cut off from
the substance of his work and then, secondly, from the product of his labor.”15 This “double
alienation” of what Grondin is describing is a loss of individuality and humanity of the worker
because the worker is losing the experiential sense of labor meaning the activity, as well as the
product of labor. This indicates that the worker, having been alienated from their labor, becomes
alienated from the experience of life.16 Expressing a similar notion, William McBride says the
best example of reification is reified labor-time because, as I have already said, labor becomes a
commodified thing meaning the worker is a commodity himself/herself.
15 Grondin, “Reification from Lukács to Habermas,” 90
16 This notion will be important for our discussion of Heidegger’s anxiety
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Labor-time is contrasted to leisure-time in society. I think of leisure-time as the time
when the worker has the opportunity to not be alienated. Leisure-time is still reified time,
because the worker still feels like they are in an objectified state like they do in labor-time, there
is a loss of naturalness to time itself. The reason leisure-time is reified time is the worker has to
go back to work giving them only a limited amount of time to do things. Therefore, the social
construction of “weekends” is an example of reified leisure-time. With leisure-time limited by
bosses, the worker’s leisure time is reduced to only being able to buy other commodities.
If workers sees themselves as a commodity (thing), then they see other aspects of their
existence as things, because the only part of their life that matters is being a worker. It is not
because they enjoy working; the reason it matters is so they can buy other commodities and
participate in society.17 The effect upon the worker is that they literally feel alien, like they do
not belong to the world. Life itself takes on a level of unconquerable absurdity, because the
subjectivity of the worker is reduced to a quantified relation. For this reason, I think that there is
some relation between Heidegger’s lived experience of anxiety and Lukács. Whether or not we
can make the explicit connection might be difficult, but there is definitely some reason to
conclude that Heidegger had at least engaged with some concepts from Lukács.
A central theme for both Heidegger and Lukács is the alienation of the individual. Lukács
is pretty unclear about how he defines alienation in History and Class Consciousness, which he
even acknowledged later in life. However, McBride seems to say that alienation is dependent on
reification, because alienation encapsulates what experience is occurring in reification for the
worker. There is still a lot of debate surrounding what Lukács meant by “alienation.” While
McBride says it is up for debate, we will move past it, because that debate goes beyond our
discussion. One part where there is agreement, is that alienation only occurs when there is
17 McBride, “Reification Re-examined,” 118
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oppression.18 It would make sense to think of alienation as a dependent result of the process of
reification, among other results as well. It is here that we can begin to see the relationship of
Heidegger and Lukács, because both are trying to move away from the objectivized experience
of the subject. Both believe that positivism has reduced the subject to become a passive onlooker
of their own experience. For the sake of brevity, we will be focusing on the discussion of anxiety
in Being and Time. Generally, anxiety stands out as the most applicable concept when discussing
the effects that an individual can feel by living in a society. So a way to understand how the
figures are related, is to look at anxiety itself and what it means. This will also show us how
reification may be applied when we talk about anxiety. However, it should be clear that anxiety,
like labor, is not simply a thing.
18 Ibid., 114
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III. In their respective works, Lukács and Heidegger are critiquing the pervasiveness of
positivist methodologies that were happening in the academic fields in the 1920’s. The reason
both philosophers are trying to move away from positivism has to do with the desire to bring the
individual back into the forefront of philosophy; to bring them back into subjectivity, because
subjectivity had become reified in the philosophical tradition. At the center of both philosophers’
thoughts was that the description of the feeling of alienation from the world had become reduced
from an experience, to a thing. “The critique of alienation [...] is another central theme that the
views of Heidegger and Lukács have in common. Both present alienation as a process of radical
occultation of what in their eyes constitutes the essence of human experience.”19 We will come
back to their similarities when we talk about Lukács’ criticism of Heidegger, because their
similarities truly highlight what Lukács’ problem was. This will also make the possible
relationship between anxiety and reification more clear. Ultimately, what we will need to decide
is if the proletariat, that Lukács is talking about, can be worked in with Dasein from Heidegger. I
should also add that both Lukács and Heidegger were fans of Dostoevsky, who is noted for
giving great literary accounts of hopelessness.20
First, in order to understand how anxiety and reification are possibly related, it is
important to understand that Heidegger is trying to show that anxiety is a lived-experience.
Heidegger starts his section on anxiety by differentiating it from fear. He says that anxiety for
Dasein is like a flight from itself and its potentiality for being. “Fear”, for Heidegger, is a
phenomenon for Dasein wherein it is “always a detrimental innerworldly being, approaching
nearby from a definite region, which may remain absent.”21 The only things that can be
19 Nicolas Tertulian, “Lukács Ontology,” in Lukács Today, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1988), 267
20 Tertulian, “Lukács Ontology,” 264
21 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1953), 180
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“fearsome” are innerworldly beings. These “innerworldly beings” are things in the world, like
another person. Therefore fear seems to be like a subject-object construction, whereas anxiety is
more related to literal experience. He believes that we mischaracterize fear as anxiety and
anxiety as fear, because that which we fear is usually thought of as something we can flee from.
But when we actually are in fear, while we may be physically “fleeing,” we are existentially
going towards that which we fear in our consciousnesses. What I mean here is that Dasein is
orienting their being towards the fear. This means that fear is about things. One cannot have fear
without anxiety first, but one can have anxiety exclusively.
Anxiety is not only anxiety about… , but is at the same time, as attunement,
anxiety for… That for which anxiety is anxious is not a definite kind of being and
possibility of Dasein. The threat itself is, after all, indefinite and thus cannot
penetrate threateningly to this or that factically concrete potentiality of being.
What anxiety is anxious for is being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety, the things at
hand in the surrounding world sink away, and so do innerworldly beings in
general. The “world” can offer nothing more, nor can the Dasein-with of others.
Thus anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself,
falling prey, in terms of the “world” and the public way of being interpreted. It
throws Dasein back upon that for which it is anxious, its authentic potentiality-
for-being-in-the-world.22
Heidegger is saying that anxiety is about nothingness in the sense that it cannot be tangibly
understood in terms of things. “Anxiety, as a mode of attunement,[...] discloses the world as
world,” this makes Dasein unable to understand things because the things “sink away” into the
world, meaning things lose meaning.23 Anxiety makes Dasein like an object, because there is a
loss of potentiality-for-being-in-the-world and it makes Dasein lose sense of being-in-the-world.
Which means that Dasein is not literally disappearing from the world; they are not ceasing to
exist. So ultimately Dasein is in-the-world but there is no sense of being. What I mean here is
22 Ibid., 181-182
23 Ibid., 181
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Dasein knows the world as an abstraction, but doesn't understand the world, and therefore
Dasein doesn’t understand itself.
As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons Heidegger and Lukács have similarities is
because of their opposition to positivism and their interest in the phenomenon of alienation.
Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety makes it very explicit, because he points out that society
thinks of anxiety exclusively as a physiological thing or a medical condition. This diminishes
anxiety’s ontological standing by reducing it into a thing and not understanding it as a lived
experience. He says “the physiological triggering of anxiety is possible only because Dasein is
anxious in the very ground of its being.”24 The goal of his phenomenology is to understand the
experience of how things are; so while he does not literally say “anxiety is a lived experience,”
his methodology does. Anxiety is not simply feeling sadness as a result of chemical imbalances,
which is the predominant contemporary conclusion. Rather, anxiety is a loss of meaning for
everything in the world; an alienation from the world itself. It is like watching yourself drown in
a mirror underwater.
Also, it is somewhat clear that Heidegger is not exclusively talking about anxiety as a
philosophical concept, because of how he describes the effect anxiety has on Dasein. This leads
me to believe that he is also adding a psychoanalytic theme to his discussion of anxiety. William
Blattner posits that what Heidegger means by “anxiety,” in our modern context probably means
“depression,” or “hopelessness.” These similarities are rooted in the German word angst, which
can mean both “anxiety,” and “depression.”25 Blattner describes anxiety as “a complete collapse
of the structure of meaning in which one lives. In anxiety one does not constitute oneself,
24 Ibid., 183
25 William Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006), 138
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because one cannot. In a sense, one is unable to exist.”26 We are forced to be in the world and not
only understand the world but also the things in the world. In anxiety, we only see the world as
world; things have no meaning. We know what is in the world, but it does not help us understand
the world, and if we can not understand the world then we cannot understand ourselves.
Heidegger is not exclusively talking about Dasein individually, he is also talking about Dasein
with others. This is only to show that anxiety is not solipsism, but an alienation from the world
and others. As a result, the world loses its handiness. “The world has nothing to offer, not
because there is something defective in the world per se, but rather because in anxiety everything
about the world, including especially the ways we might carry on in life, are insignificant.”27 I
agree with Blattner’s idea that what Heidegger meant by “anxiety,” is what we mean when we
talk about “depression.” There are other ontological qualities to anxiety, however for our
discussion we have been mainly concerned with the psychologization of anxiety.
Heidegger differentiates fear and anxiety, and he says that fear is rooted in a type of
relationship with things in the world. Anxiety is related more to existence itself and the very
nature of being in the world. However, since anxiety is a mode of attunement or as we say
“mood,” I think that there is something off in thinking about anxiety as purely individual because
of being-with-others and being-in-the-world. To me, this implies that there is a societal/social
aspect to anxiety that Heidegger does not adequately account for because, despite his discussion
of worldliness, his main focus is on the individual experience in Dasein. But just because his
focus was the individual, doesn’t mean that it neglected the collective individual.
The reason that Heidegger is important for our project in the discussion of reification is
because, while he may be missing the social connection that one could (should) make between
26 Ibid., 139-140
27 Ibid., 141
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anxiety, he does make a strong criticism of the objectivized experience of anxiety. On a greater
scale, he possibly lays a groundwork to discuss how our experience in society affects our
psychology and experience by giving us a good definition about the existential qualities of
anxiety. Generally, anxiety is something that is otherwise understood from a scientific
foundation, and thus anxiety is seen as thing that happens in our minds, and not an experience in
our being. From our discussion of anxiety, and our discussion of reification, we can see that both
philosophers were concerned with the reduction of the subjectivity of the individual.
Lukács and Heidegger were ultimately interested in understanding the history of the
individual through the lense of philosophy. To this effect, Lucien Goldmann says that both
figures had studied the traditions of Kierkegaard and Hegel.28 If this is the case, both Lukács and
Heidegger were trying to provide philosophy that will help the reader understand the point in
time they are in from the subjective perspective. Lukács has a Marxist understanding of history,
while Heidegger has a romantic understanding. This “romantic understanding” is likely why
Heidegger does not take any explicit positions about society and keeps his thoughts more
abstract in Being and Time and uses Dasein as his subject while Lukacs thinks of the proletariat
as his subject. As Goldmann states “[...]for Heidegger the historical subject is the individual
whereas Lukács, tracing in it the authentic tradition of Hegel and Marx, conceives of history as
the action of the transindividual subject and, in particular, of social classes [emphasis added].”29
This distinction is mainly what Lukács uses in his criticism of Heidegger because Lukács is
focused on the collective individual; society. Both philosophers are trying to find a way to bring
subjectivity back to the forefront of philosophy, however Lukács brings a more worldly
understanding to it, because he is more grounded in Hegel and Marx. This means that Lukács’
28 Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, trans. William Q. Boelhower, (Boston:
Routledge, 1998), 5
29 Ibid., 8
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philosophy brings in the historically materialistic understanding that is shown in disciplines like
anthropology, sociology, politics, and even psychology. Goldmann states: “being and history for
Heidegger are situated on the ontological level [...]”30 This means that Heidegger is saying that
history is rooted in being, and is maybe not as rooted in the sciences like anthropology, sociology,
and psychology. Lukács is no stranger to sociology and openly embraces aspects of other fields.
However, since both are trying to bring subjectivity back to the front of philosophy, both Lukács
and Heidegger agree that philosophy was falling to positivism, but Heidegger thought those “soft
sciences” are also often examples of positivist thoughts. Which is why he strived for more
universal explanations. As we will see, Lukács’ problem with Heidegger seems to be as much of
a personal problem as it is a philosophical one.
I generally agree with Lukács’ criticism that I am about to explain. First, Lukács states
that Heidegger’s individualistic ideas about Dasein and existence were “epistemological hocus-
pocus, so typical of the whole imperialist period [...]”31 He says this because Heidegger was
trying to find a way around materialism and idealism. This “third way” for Heidegger “gave the
impression of an objectivity independent of human consciousness.”32 Lukács says Heidegger is
replacing actual objectivity in the world, with “pseudo-objectivity,” because Heidegger is
making his assumptions from the realm of consciousness; that he is making objective claims
from a subjective foundation. From this notion, Lukács says that despite Heidegger’s efforts to
separate ontology from anthropology, he ends up basically creating a pseudo-anthropology
despite his efforts. Heidegger is trying to describe the nature of being abstractly, but results in
positing an abstract theory of man. Lukács calls the result of this attempted distinction: “[...]no
30 Ibid., 15.
31 Lukács, “Martin Heidegger,” in The Lukács Reader, ed. Arpad Kardarkay (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers,
1995), 267
32 Ibid., 267, 268
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more than an abstractly mythicizing, anthropological description of human existence.”33 Since
we have established that Lukács is saying that Heidegger is presenting a pseudo-anthropology,
Lukács then points us to the post-First-War period in which Being and Time was written. He
states that this was a time wherein the people of Germany were feeling lost in the world. With
this being the case, Heidegger appealed to the notion of individualistic freedom that is inherent in
imperialistic bourgeois thought. He further says that Heidegger was writing when the Western-
world was seeing both the horrors of early-20th century “monopoly capitalism” and the rise of a
strong socialist superpower.34 The reason I agree with Lukács’ point about Heidegger presenting
a pseudo-anthropology, is because Being and Time does sound like an abstract theory of man at
times.
As we have seen Lukács is not necessarily against the idea of the individual subject, but
what is at the core of his criticism is the fact that he thinks Heidegger’s phenomenology of
existence is geared too much towards the individual and not enough by the collective individual.
This is problematic for Lukács because by orienting a philosophy towards the sole individual, it
is able to be more effectively worked into a bourgeois ideology. This effectively avoids the
experience of the working class because it does not account for a class consciousness. I think that
both Lukács and Heidegger would agree that most people of this time were feeling lost and
hopeless, however Lukács thinks that this feeling of hopelessness is better understood through
the lense of the working class. Lukács also says that even if Heidegger wasn’t purposely ignoring
the struggles of the working class, he still did ignore them, which is also indicated by
Heidegger’s association with the Nazi Party.35 Lukács thinks that Heidegger was ignoring the
obvious missing piece of his phenomenology by not talking about the working class experience.
33 Ibid., 271
34 Ibid., 276, 281
35 Ibid., 281
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Heidegger may or may not have been purposely ignoring the working class, but he certainly did
not write for them to read his material, so it does make sense that Lukács is saying that
Heidegger’s thoughts are inherently bourgeois. But since Heidegger has inspired so many liberal
philosophers like de Beauvoir, Sartre, and Marcuse to name a few, I am not sure if I agree with
Lukács’ implication that Heidegger’s philosophy is only geared towards the bourgeois, because
he did not mention them by name either. Also, I am able to find the implications of how anxiety
is applicable to the working class experience, however that may be because of my understanding
of other leftist philosophers, but I don’t think there is any denying that people in Germany were
feeling hopeless during this time, and a lot of them happened to be working class.
Lukács makes the criticism that Heidegger’s phenomenology focused too much on the
individual and not enough on the others in society, mainly those in the working class. This led
Lukács to say that Heidegger’s implications about society weren’t reflective of the actual
struggle of the working class, and that Heidegger appealed more to the bourgeois class because
his philosophy was so individualistic. However, that does not suggest that Heidegger was wrong
in how he describes the lived experience of anxiety, or that it cannot be attributed to the lived
experience that those in the working class have. As we will see, Marcuse provides us a way of
making the connection between the social aspect of labor and our psychology.
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IV. Heidegger was not from the Marxist tradition, so the problems that he wanted to solve in
philosophy were not rooted in the class struggle; he wanted to outline the experience of the
individual. This focus on Dasein as the subject in a time when the experience of being a subject
was seemingly becoming objectified is what attracted Herbert Marcuse to want to study with
Heidegger at Freiburg. Marcuse was from the Marxist tradition, but like Lukács he believed that
most of Marxist discourse had overlooked the individual experience.36 I agree with John
Abromeit’s claim that Marcuse was adding Heidegger’s phenomenology to a Marxist framework.
Marcuse was also heavily influenced by Lukács’ theory of reification because he thought that it
was a good way of understanding the way that material conditions affect aspects of life like
psychology. Ultimately, what the difference between Lukács and Heidegger is, is that they
highlight and blame the reduction of subjectivity on different aspects of temporality; Heidegger
on abstractions and misunderstandings of time and Lukács on the reification of labor/leisure-
time.37 A lot of Marxists deemed History and Class Consciousness as being too metaphysically
abstract and not actually helpful in analyzing the exploitation of workers.38 One of the aspects
that Marcuse respected about Heidegger was his understanding of historicity for Dasein, because
the way most Marxists had described history usually was based out of “objective historical
laws.”39 What this means is that Marcuse was also trying to move away from positivism. He also
thought that Heidegger’s notion of historicity was useful because it made clear that Marcuse
thought of the subject as one with a given place and time in history, whether it is past, present, or
future. For Marcuse, this makes the individual even more at the front because Lukács did not go
into the abstract ramifications of time that Heidegger did. Ultimately the reason Marcuse ended
36 John Abromeit, “Herbert Marcuse’s Critical Encounter with Martin Heidegger 1927-33,” In Herbert Marcuse: A
Critical Reader, ed. John Abromeit & W. Mark Cobb (New York: Routledge, 2004), 133
37 Ibid., 135
38 Ibid., 144
39 Ibid., 134
White 27
up engaging with Heidegger’s historicity was because Heidegger focused on the movement of
history at the level of the sole individual. Lukács’ historicity was the movement of history for the
collective class of individuals, i.e. the proletariat..
Marcuse wants to be able to look at the individual, and since he is a Marxist, he is
looking at the effects that a capitalist society has on the individual or how that capitalist society
affects one’s experience. The reason that Marcuse felt as though he was able to use these abstract
concepts from Heidegger, is because he thought that a phenomenology of experience was able to
explain the material conditions of people in the world specifically because it focuses on
experience. So in that regard he is agreeing with Lukács’ criticism, because he is saying that
Heidegger can and should be extended to talk about the oppression of the working class. Even
further, Marcuse uses this similar critique of explaining why Heidegger did not dissociate from
the Nazi Party. Because seemingly, Heidegger could have talked about the plight of workers, but
didn’t. And this lack of an account for material conditions made Heidegger’s thoughts not as
concrete for Marcuse, according to Abromeit.40 The main reason that I outlined Heidegger in the
previous part is for the same reason that Marcuse engaged with Heideggerian philosophy;
because Existential Phenomenology, when applied to a material understanding of conditions,
allows for us to understand the effect the material world has on experience. Marcuse also shares
the same criticism with Lukács, which is that Heidegger neglected to talk about the social reality
that many individuals faced.41 Marcuse, after his interest in philosophers like Heidegger, Lukács,
and Hegel, began to venture into psychoanalytic philosophy. Since Heidegger is writing about
some type of abstract theory of man, it makes sense that Marcuse would focus on the psychology
of the individual. It appears to me that Lukács was also talking about how the psychology of an
40 Ibid., 137
41 Ibid., 143
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individual was affected when he was talking about the exploitation of the worker’s labor. The
reason that I highlighted anxiety from Heidegger, is because that phenomenon that he is
describing is very real and takes place on account of being exploited by a capitalist society. The
worker becomes a thing, they lose any sense of autonomy, because they don’t feel natural.
Grondin on the effect of alienation on the worker says:
The alienation of the worker in regard to the reified substance of his work follows
in the wake of a decomposition of his subjectivity. The human being must
[repress] the whole affective, or qualitative, side of his person when he works at
the factory, where the quantitative imperatives of the rationalized process of
production reign supreme. Consequently, the subject loses its active character in
order to become the passive spectator of what happens to it. Man no longer
appears as the bearer and the accountable source of social reality, as the axle
which makes the system turn, but as one if its cogs.42
This quote is important because I think Grondin highlights what is a major theme in some of
Marcuse’s Five Lectures, because he is talking about how Marx could be added to Freudian
psychoanalysis. While Freud is not that relevant, the way that Marcuse describes the effects of a
capitalist society on an individual’s psychology is relevant, because he is seemingly alluding to
the process of reification. The first lecture covers freedom and the second covers progress, both
provide a nice way of expanding on some notions that we have covered with Lukács and
Heidegger, however more of it is related to Lukács. In his lecture on freedom he talks about how
the ruling class is a class of domination over the individual. He says that as society has advanced,
the ruling class has found a way of making domination less personally oppressive and more
universal. This means that the individual (worker) is faced with a false sense of freedom, because
they are able to purchase things that satisfy their needs. The worker feels free, but is actually
dominated by the ruling class’s rules or social norms. This means that the needs of the worker
42 Grondin, “Reification from Lukács to Habermas,” 90
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are actually dictated by the working class, and not by themselves.43 Because of these oppressive
“laws” that dictate the workers repress their humanity, the worker’s sole goal is labor. By
humanity I literally mean, their human-ness, or rather their non-objectivity. Marcuse says this as
a way to indicate that the worker never works for themselves, because happiness becomes a
reward for doing labor for someone.44 Here we can begin to see the more explicit relationship
with Lukács, because we see that time is split into labor-time and “non-labor” time. Marcuse
says that time is becoming more universalized, which is a negative thing, because time is being
essentially controlled by the ruling class. This means that leisure-time is no longer something
that is autonomous, this seems to be referencing the reification of labor-time that we talked about
from Lukács.45 Marcuse also shows that the domination and exploitation of the workers is not
solely at the hands of the bosses, like it was for Marx. He says that there is a strong relationship
between the political, economic, and military spheres, which also indicates to me that he is
referring to the structural qualities of reification in society. One part of this lecture that extends
some of Lukács’ thoughts is how Marcuse talks about the organization of labor, because it
explains how the workers don’t unite for a revolution because if the ruling class can make the
dominated class associate pleasure with labor because of the relationship of leisure-time and
labor-time, then they have no reason to unite; all the worker needs is already presented to
purchase. Any possibility for the experience of pleasure to happen, is presupposed by the idea
that one must labor. This account, I think more accurately describes how the worker feels
hopeless and in anxiety because of labor. This is because Marcuse is highlighting that any quest
for happiness or “freedom” is almost an absurd notion in a capitalist society, because leisure-
time is reified. The reason this relates to anxiety, is because when one is repressing their needs
43 Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures, trans. Jeremy Shapiro & Shierry Weber (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970,) 2-3
44 Ibid., 9
45 Ibid., 14
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they are living inauthentically. The world is there for the worker, but the worker can’t have any
possibility of being free in the world, because they can’t understand it. Thus they are feeling like
an object. I am neglecting to mention how he ropes in Freudian analysis, but that isn’t really
subtracting from what he is talking about in relation to the exploitation of workers, because what
is being presented is the idea that material conditions affect our experience, and more explicitly,
our psychology. For the case of the worker in capitalism, the exploitation of their labor, leads to
a type of alienation because the worker represses their pleasure needs. Here, I mean they never
authentically experience pleasure, because their pleasure is always presupposed by labor. And if
their pleasure is presupposed by labor, then the worker never even knows that are being
exploited because they associate the need for buying commodities for pleasure with labor. 46
46 Ibid., 21
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V. I have shown the relationship between reification and commodity fetishism, the
difference is mainly their contexts. For Lukács, reification is a sociological construction that is
an expansion from the economic and objectivistic Orthodox Marxist account for reified labor and
time. What is at the center of commodity fetishism and reification is the idea of alienation,
Lukács makes the idea of a social alienation clearer than Marx, because reification is a
sociological phenomenon. Alienation is a flight from the social sphere, but it is rooted in reified
labor. This makes the worker feel like a thing in society. Heidegger’s anxiety provides a good
analysis of how the alienation that is felt is an experience and not a thing, because Heidegger is
also responding to positivist thought like Lukács. Lukács’ criticism of Heidegger allows for us to
see that Heidegger’s analysis should be extended to a material understanding of history. By
doing this, we see that Existential Phenomenology has merit in a Marxist framework, because
authors like Marcuse were able to rectify both philosophers. We can now see whether reification
makes sense to describe what is happening to working class people currently. Ultimately I don’t
think that reification adequately describes the experience that is happening in the contemporary
context. That does not mean that I reject reification at all, in fact I still embrace it as a concept,
and think that it provides a useful tool in understanding. I just believe that we have moved on
from reification, much like how reification was a move from commodity fetishism. The
difference for reification and commodity fetishism was mainly in the context. Lukács proposed
reification was more of a structural process that affected society and the class consciousness,
whereas commodity fetishism was something that was rooted in positivism and scientific thought.
Lukács was writing about the problems of industrial capitalism that were inherent to the early
20th century. As I mentioned earlier there is a great amount of difference in societies in
industrial capitalism and late-stage capitalism. Class structure is different because there is a
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middle class, although that is gradually changing. People in 2020 have significantly greater
technologies and the whole economic and political landscape is different because of globalized
economies. So I think we would be playing philosophical ventriloquism if we thought that
reification could just be historically translated into contemporary times. Commodity fetishism
was describing a process that occurred when Marx was writing Capital; reification was for a
problem when Lukács was writing History and Class Consciousness. Therefore both concepts
are similar, yet they have distinct contexts associated with them. Although epistemologically,
their processes are very similar.
However, it just so happens that what is occurring in the experience of the working class
today happens to be very similar to what was happening in 1923 wherein people were being
exploited in a capitalist society. The ways people are exploited differ because the times are
different. When Lukács was writing, unions weren’t even a thing yet; most labor was hard
manual and physical labor. Today, you don’t see as many people suiting up to go to the factory,
though there still are people who do so. We have so many other different types of jobs where a
boss can exploit their workers. The overarching concept of wage-slavery is one that persists
throughout history, this points to a more dialectical notion that capitalism is essentially neo-
feudalism.
Ultimately, what I am saying is that reification can help us understand and even describe
the process that occurs when subjectivity is reduced to objectivity; however we may want to
avoid saying “reification.” By not using the word “reification,” we are not harming the actual
analysis and critique of living in capitalism from Lukács, but merely allowing the concept to
remain authentic to what time in history it is describing. Bewes points out that by attributing
reification to the modern world, one is literally reifying reification, because they are alienating
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themselves from the original notions from which it was established.47 This means that one is
thinking of the concept of reification as a thing. I mentioned earlier that in explaining reification
it is difficult to not fall victim to the process that it is describing, that is ultimately why I suggest
that reification more accurately describes capitalism before the modern era. What I described in
the first part about COVID-19 and the problems that it is exposing about our modern capitalist
society, only scratches at the surface of what type of problems and exploitations occur within a
capitalist society. Further, the problems that I talked about weren’t started because of the
pandemic, they were bound to happen because of what our society is structured on; exploitation.
People have long felt like objects and just cogs in the machine of modern capitalist society and
they will continue. McBride mentions that the great powers of the world have even more of a
tremendous amount of force and ability to inflict violence in the world, so by describing
reification as a modern process, one detracts from the experiences of those that are actually
exploited. Because the world has grown to become more complex, we cannot call the
exploitation of workers today simply the process of reification. 48Anxiety might be more
applicable to the modern world, for Heidegger was purposely abstract and trying to avoid
material understandings. Lukács’ criticism actually helps make anxiety make more sense under a
modern context, because his criticism says that Heidegger is positing an abstract theory of man.
By anxiety being abstract in its original construction, I think it has less connotation with the time
it is written. Lukács explicitly said that reification was not metaphysically abstract, and that it
was a structuring principle of society at his time. If we extend reification to the modern context,
we are losing the historic sense of what the word is, and thus making it more abstract. This is
what is at the core of most people’s problems with “reification.” Reification is not a historically
47 Bewes, Reification, 94
48 McBride, “Reification Re-examined,” 121
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translatable concept, because it is rooted in historicity itself. So to answer the question from
earlier: is reification relevant for contemporary society? As we have seen, the answer is yes and
no. Yes, because the actual process of the worker’s consciousness being reduced to an object is
still present. Further, there are still countless aspects of our society that are reified. However the
reason we may want to move past “reification” is because the term is too loaded with the history
associated with it, that it neglects to accurately reflect the whole exploitation of a worker today,
and that there are probably better terms that can describe the psychology of an alienated worker.
Therefore “reification” is a great tool for understanding how the consciousness is affected by
modern capitalist society, but does not capture the full picture.
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